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This paper evaluates the effects of capital account controls adopted in the past years by 
the FLAR’s member countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Perú and 
Venezuela) on the efficiency of the banking sector, the economic growth and the 
volatility of output, consumption, and investment. The findings on efficiency show that 
the degree of the monopoly power in the loans and deposits markets are positively 
correlated with capital controls. The findings also indicate that, in general, capital 
controls neither reduce growth nor reduce macroeconomic volatility. On the contrary, 
and as it is expected, the capital account openness promotes growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of  capital account controls that have been 
adopted in the past by the FLAR’s member countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Perú and Venezuela) with varying degrees of intensity, on the efficiency of the banking sector, on 
the one hand, and on their economic growth and volatility of output, consumption, and investment.  
 
The adoption of capital account controls usually is made on behalf of such worthy goals as to 
isolate the country from the pervasive effects of short term capital flows that disrupt the normal 
pace of economic activity, affects the well being of the population and, some times, (capital flights) 
deepens the level of poverty for long periods of time. The expected benefits of capital controls are 
thus seen in terms of greater macroeconomic stability, mainly in terms of lower volatility of output, 
employment, and consumption. The costs are related to the administrative difficulties in managing 
the regime and also, especially in this paper, with the protectionism provided to the financial sector. 
Of course, the realization of those benefits and costs corresponds to situations when capital 
controls are effective in terms of isolating the economy from capitals flows, which is not always the 
case. 
 
In theory, capital mobility increases efficiency and productivity (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Stulz, 1999), permits smooth consumption and investment through international risk sharing (Fisher, 
1930; Sach, 1981; Stockman, 1988; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996), reduces macroeconomic 
volatility (Razin and Rose, 1994; Sutherland; 1996; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2000) and, as 
consequence, promotes growth (Borts and Stein, 1964; MacDougall, 1968; Kemp and Liviatan, 
1973; McKinnon, 1973; Hanson, 1974; Frenkel, 1976; Levine, 1997; Klein, 2005).
3 
  
Competitive banking sectors contribute to growth through a more efficient intermediation of 
savings. In particular, ceteris paribus, a higher degree of competition in the banking sector should 
translate into a lower spread between the loans and the deposits interest rate. The smaller the 
spread that the banks charge for the intermediation of funds, the  lower the costs agents, both 
producers and consumers, have to pay for access to credit and, consequently, the greater their 
possibilities of production and demand. The overall economy then benefits with higher levels of 




                                                   
3 Two recent broad theoretical and empirical discussions on financial integration and its macroeconomic effects 
are Eichengreen (2003) and Prasad et. al. (2004). Notice that here we will mean the same when we use the 
categories ‘capital account liberalization’, ‘capital account openness’, ‘financial liberalization’, ‘financial 
integration’, or ‘financial globalization’.   3 
In developing countries, with lower levels of funds available from domestic and external savings, 
more efficient financial systems are an especially important element in the determination of their 
possibilities of economic growth. However, the empirical evidence shows that in these countries 
spreads are higher than in the developed countries.
4  
  
The results of the voluminous empirical literature on the potential benefits (costs) on economic 
growth of  the capital account liberalization  (control) are mixed.
5 The Rodrik’s (1989) paper, 
maybe the most known and cited study on this issue, shows no relationship between capital 
account liberalization  and growth. On the contrary, the Quinn’s (1997) paper, another well cited 
study, finds a positive relationship between the change in his measure of the capital account 
liberalization and growth. Among the twelve papers reported by Edison et al. (2004, Table 6), six 
out of twelve found that the capital account liberalization significantly raises growth. The others do 
not support this hypothesis.  
 
Many findings are different depending on whether data refer to high income countries or to low 
income ones. For example, Klein and Olivei (1999) and Edwards (2001) found support for the 
hypothesis for the former countries while reject it for the later countries. On the contrary, Quinn 
(1997) and Bekaert  et al. (2001) show evidence that capital account liberalization endorses 
growth in low income countries. Edison (2004, p. 1-2) and Klein (2005) showed that when 
institutional variables are included in growth regression models, the effect of the capital account 
openness is washed out. However, they argued, when regression models allow for institutional and 
nonlinearities on the explanatory variables, the responsiveness of growth to capital account 
liberalization rises. Their results are poor, though. For example, Klein found that only for about 
one-quarter of the countries in his sample, there is a statistically significant effect of capital account 
openness on economic growth. Besides, the positive evidence is for middle income countries, 
though nor for poorer o richer countries.
6 “In short, while financial  globalization can, in theory, help 
to promote economic growth through various channels, there is as yet no robust empirical evidence 








                                                   
4 See Catao (1998). 
5 Excellent reviews on this topic are Edison et al. (2002), Edison et al. (2004), and Prasad et al. (2004). Notice that 
we will mean the same when we use the categories ‘capital account liberalization’, ‘capital account openness’, 
‘financial liberalization’, ‘financial integration’, or ‘financial globalization’.   
6 Except for Bolivia, the other FLAR members are classified by Edison et al. (2004, Table 10) as middle-income 
countries.   4 
With respect to the effects of  the capital account liberalization on macroeconomic volatility, the 
empirical literature is limited. Moreover, it has been dedicated mostly to study output volatility and 
little to consumption volatility. The recent evidence provided by Prasad et al. (2004, Table 4) 
shows that liberalizations of the capital account seems to have declined, on average, output and 
consumption volatility for industrial economies and “less financially integrated (LFI)” developing 
economies, but a they have a modest decline in the “more financially integrated (MFI)” developing 
economies. Even, for the MFI countries, the volatility of private consumption raised in the 1990s 
relative to the 1980s.
7  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section answers the question of 
what is the relation between capital controls and the degree of monopoly power in the banking 
sector in the FLAR’s member countries. With this purpose, it first describes the evolution of capital 
controls in these countries. In order to measure the degree of competitiveness in the banking 
sector, a model with sound microeconomic principles for the determination of the spread of a 
banking firm is estimated. The results on the degree of monopoly power in the loans and deposits 
markets are shown to be positively correlated with capital controls. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Perú have the largest spreads and it is found the other facts explaining the differences in 
spreads, besides the varying degrees of monopoly power, are the marginal operating costs; the 
probabilities of liquidity shortfalls; the cost of capital; the proportion of non performing loans, and 
the ratio of reserve requirements.  
 
The third section estimates standard empirical specifications of growth models to evaluate  the 
consequences of the capital account controls on economic growth and macroeconomic volatility (of 
output, consumption, and investment) in the FLAR’s member countries. Yearly data covering the 
period from 1983 to 2003 is used. The econometric techniques are cointegration á la Johansen, 
dynamic panel data models, and instrumental variables procedures. The findings also indicate that, 
in general, capital account controls neither improve growth nor decreases macroeconomic volatility. 
On the contrary, the openness of the capital account promotes growth. Finally, the fourth section 
summarizes the conclusions and discusses some of the policy implications.  
 
2.  Capital account controls and efficiency of the banking system 
 
This chapter evaluates how controls on the capital account affect the efficiency of the banking 
system. Even if the original intention for imposing those controls may be thought of reaching higher 
macroeconomic stability, like the reduction of the impact of capital outflows on the level and the 
volatility of output and consumption, the instruments usually used to implement those controls have 
a strong impact on the protection provided to the domestic financial markets and, particularly, to 
the banking sector.  
                                                   
7 The positive productivity and output shocks that faced developing countries during the late 1980s and 1990s, 
as well as the procyclicality nature of capital flows, “appear [s] to have had an adverse impact on consumption 
volatility” in these countries (Ibid., p. 23).      5 
A typical example is the prohibition for domestic residents to constitute deposits in foreign currency 
within the local financial system. In face of a situation of massive international capital flows, at first 
glance it may contribute to reduce the magnitude of their impact on deposits in the local financial 
sector, the soundness of the system, the level of loans provided for productive activities and 
consumption, and  the aggregate level of economic activity. However the imposition of these 
barriers also implies that the local financial system becomes isolated from the competition of foreign 
financial intermediaries in the market for deposits in foreign currency. The resulting protectionism is 
even larger when that measure is accompanied by the prohibition for foreign banks to offer 
deposits to domestic residents in the local market, as is usually the case. 
 
In order to measure the importance of the capital account controls or, equivalently, the restrictions 
to financial liberalization, two different sets of indicators will be used in the second section, as in 
Prasad, et.al. (2004). The first one consists of official, or de jure restrictions on the capital 
account. The second set corresponds to  de facto, or observed indicators of effective financial 
integration. It is important to mention that differences in the enforcement of the law between two 
countries may contribute to explain differences in the level of de facto indicators even for the same 
level of  de jure indicators, since agents may evade the regulation if the enforcement is weak. 
However, de jure indicators are useful to explain the intentions of polices adopted with regard to 
the liberalization of the financial markets. In addition, even in the absence of formal restrictions to 
capital flows, some developing countries may present low indices of de facto liberalization due to 
the relatively low degree of effective financial integration to the rest of the world.  
 
2.1 Basic facts about capital controls 
 
In order to measure the official restrictions to the  capital  account, a set of  de jure indicators 
constructed from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER) will be used. In particular, the disaggregated indices (dummies with values 1 if a 
restriction exist and 0, otherwise)
8 for twelve different categories of restrictions on payments for the 










                                                   
8 Notice that the dummy nature of the restrictions makes that averaging them is equivalent to divide the number 
of transactions subject to controls by the total number of transactions considered in the analysis, which is a 
proxy for the degree of intensity of the controls, as it is understood by von Hagen and Zhou (2005).   6 
by Miniane (2004), and extended to cover also the years 2001-2003, will be used.
9 
  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of a total index that corresponds to the average over the values 
adopted by each of the twelve categories for three groups of countries,
10 namely, FLAR’s, 
emerging markets and developing countries. It may be observed that the index for developing 
countries and emerging markets increased sharply since 1997, after the Asian crises, indicating the 
adoption of more restrictions on capital flows. However, in the FLAR’s group, it continued with its 
declining tendency along all the period and only as recently as 2001 increased again smoothly. A 
decomposition of the total index in the twelve subcategories shows that the main driving forces of 
these different paths correspond to the changes adopted in capital market securities, collective 
investment, derivatives, and provisions specific to institutional investors, as shown in Figure 2, even 
though, in this case, new restrictions are adopted in the FLAR’s group in 2003. 
 
Among the FLAR countries, Figures 3 and 4 show that with the exception of Colombia, the other 
countries loosened controls in 1991-1997, but after 1998, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela started 















                                                   
9 These twelve categories refer to purchase and sales by residents and nonresidents of the following assets: 1) 
capital market securities which includes shares and other participating securities, as well as bonds with maturity 
of more than one year;  2) money market instruments like certificates of deposit, treasury bills, with  an original 
maturity of one year or less; 3) collective investment securities, like mutual funds; 4) derivatives and other 
instruments; 5) commercial credits from private and multilateral  financial institutions and governments, linked to 
trade transactions; 6) financial credit; 7) guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities through authorized 
intermediaries; 8) direct investment; 9) liquidation of direct investment and repatriation of profits; 10) real estate 
transactions; 11) provisions specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions like reserves 
requirements in local and foreign currency, lending from abroad to residents, lending locally in foreign exchange 
to non-residents and residents, investments abroad by banks and in banks by nonresidents; 12) provisions 
specific to institutional investors, like the share of foreign assets in a portfolio.  
10 The indexes are weighted average of the countries total index of capital controls, where the weighting variable 
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Bolivia Costa Rica Ecuador  9 
As explained, the previous indexes show the official restrictions to capital flows. However, even 
with a full de jure restriction, countries may be financially integrated with the rest of the world if the 
enforcement of the law is weak and agents evade those restrictions; and countries with no official 
restrictions may have a low degree of effective financial integration (globalization) if competition in 
the local market from foreigners is limited due to the lack of proper financial regulations, market 
risk or other institutional reasons. Therefore, the previous indicators need to be complemented with 
other measures of effective financial integration. With this purpose, the departure from uncovered 
real interest rate parity condition will be used, similarly to the indicator proposed by Frankel 
(1992), as a measure of capital mobility.
11 
 
It is important to mention that this real differential between the domestic and foreign interest rate 
includes, among other things, the risk premium associated with specific country risk, as well as 
differences due to protectionism of the domestic financial sector. However, the country risk may 
also be endogenous to the degree of globalization of the financial sector, since a higher integration 
allows not only access to foreign savings, but also, better opportunities of risk diversification. For 
this reason, there is no need to estimate the risk premium in order to discount that component from 
the interest rate differential. 
 
Figure 5 shows that this differential has exhibited a much lower variance since the second half of the 
nineties and, also, that the mean value in this period is smaller, consistent with a higher degree of 
integration of the financial markets for these groups of countries
12 in the last ten years. However, 
for the FLAR group this differential does not show the constant pace of liberalization that was 
observed for most of the sample period with the indicator of  official restrictions. This may be 
related to the large macroeconomic imbalances that faced some of these economies during the 
eighties and that might had contributed to isolate their financial markets from the rest of the world. 
On the other hand, between 1993 and 1996, the differential shows a much lower degree of 
effective integration in developing and emerging markets, but not in the FLAR group. 
 
In the case of the individual countries within the FLAR group, Figure 6 shows a sharp contrast in 
the level and the volatility of the differential between the eighties and the nineties, especially in the 
cases of Bolivia and Perú. These two countries presented the  
                                                   
11 In particular, the following differential is estimated: 
) 1 (




t t t dev i i
p +
+ + - +
, where i and i* denote, 
respectively, the annual domestic, and foreign nominal interest rate, p the inflation rate and dev the devaluation 
of the exchange rate. It is assumed that there is perfect foresight of the exchange rate and the level of prices, so 
that the devaluation and inflation expected at time t for the following twelve months are exactly equal to the 
observed rates: (1+pt
e)=Pt+12/Pt and (1+devt
e)= E t+12/E t, where E denotes the exchange rate and P the level of 
prices. In this sense, the real interest rate (domestic and foreign) measures the effective real rate paid on term 
deposits after twelve months. 
12 The share of each country’s GDP in USA dollars within the total GDP for each group was used as a weighting 
variable. Since for some countries there is no information on GDP available for the first years of the sample, their 
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Bolivia Costa Rica Ecuadordifferentials with the largest variance and levels (positive and negative) in the eighties, and the most 
stable ones since the mid of the nineties. On average, the differential for Colombia and Costa Rica 
has fluctuated within a more stable band between 20 and minus 20 percentage points, but only 
Costa Rica presents a larger degree of de facto financial integration since the mid the nineties. 
Along the entire sample, Ecuador and Venezuela have exhibited large fluctuation of the differential, 
but the first country stabilizes since 2001. Therefore, out of the six countries, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Perú, present a higher degree of financial integration in the last years of the sample 
than Colombia and Venezuela. 
 
2.2  The degree of competitiveness in the banking sector  
 
Measuring the degree of competition in the markets for services provided by a banking system is 
not a straightforward procedure, since it requires modeling the behavior of the individual banking 
firm in those markets. 
 
Appendix 1 presents the complete model used for this purpose. The econometric estimation of its 
parameters, using monthly information for the individual banks in each of the FLAR’s member 
countries for the period 1997:2 to 2004:12 will provide an estimate of the monopoly power in the 
deposits and loans markets. This coefficient measures the degree of competition in those markets. 
In a further step it will be analyzed the relation between the degree of competition and the different 
indexes of financial liberalization. It will be shown that there exists a sound positive statistical 
correlation between the restrictions imposed on capital flows and the lack of competition in the 
banking sector. 
 
2.2.1  Main characteristics of the model used to measure the degree of 
competition in the banking sector 
 
To measure the degree of competition in the markets for loans and deposits a set up relating the 
spread between the interest rate charged on loans and the one paid on deposits will be defined. 
The spread is useful to evaluate the efficiency of the financial system in the economy. The reason is 
that the smaller the spread that the banks charge for intermediation of funds, the lower the costs 
that agents, namely, producers and consumers, have to pay for access to credit and, 
consequently, the greater their possibilities of production and demand. The overall economy then 
benefits with higher levels of efficiency in its financial system. 
 
It is assumed that the purpose of the banking firm is to maximize profits, net of the cost of capital, 
r: 
 
[ ] W E D A S E D A L b E D C D D i G G r r p + - - - - =   ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( * ) ( * ) ( E (1)  12 
Where r(G) indicates that the interest rate, r, charged by the bank for its well performing loans, G, 
is a function of their level, because the credit market may not be perfectly competitive. Similarly, 
i(D) indicates that the rate that the bank effectively pays for deposits, D, is not necessarily 
determined in a p erfectly competitive market. Also, C(.), L(.) and S(.) correspond to the 
operating costs, the costs of liquidity and the costs of solvency, respectively, and are a function of 
the scale of the bank, or total assets, A, and of the composition of the liabilities and assets. Total 
assets, A, are composed of liquid assets, R, well performing loans, G, and bad loans, B, 
(A”R+G+B) and, by the balance sheet constraint, must be equal to the sum of deposits and 
equity, W. The share of bad loans in the total portfolio of loans, E, is denoted by b (b=B/E). The 
cost of capital, r, is equal to the rate at which the bank must remunerate the shareholders so that 
they invest their savings in the bank. 
 
The bank incurs in operating costs to provide services, and consists of labor and depreciation of 
the durable goods used in the productive process. The services provided by the bank are deposits 
and loans. It is assumed that the nonperforming loans impose operating costs in addition to the 
normal ones. Therefore, besides D and E, the share of bad loans, b, which is exogenously 
determined, enters as an argument of the respective cost function. As explained in the appendix, 
the parameters of this function are estimated from a translogarithmic specification using as 
explanatory variables E, D, B, and the price of a composite factor of production. 
 
The liquidity costs are those incurred by the bank for holding a fraction of its assets in a liquid form 
in order to be able to face unexpected reductions of deposits and (contingent) enlargements of the 
loans portfolio. The uncertainty about these possible events constitutes a basic characteristic of the 
banking firm, in contrast with firms in other sectors, like manufactures. The liquidity cost has two 
components. The first one corresponds to the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets, instead of 
allocating those resources to loans with higher yields. The second component corresponds to the 
expected value of the sanction that the banks has to pay if the level of reserves, R, or liquid assets, 
turns out to be smaller than the requirement imposed by the authorities (in relation to deposits), 
after a given realization of the reduction of deposits or a contingent expansion of loans. The 
Appendix 1 explains how the joint density function of  the future reductions of deposits plus 
expansions of loans, and the requirements of reserves, is estimated by the kernel method, and how 
this function is used to estimate the liquidity costs associated with a specific level of reserves. 
 
The solvency costs are those associated with the provision of equity in order to cover eventual 
losses or negative cash flows arising from a level of obligations, namely, deposits plus operational 
costs, larger than the sum of assets and revenues. These costs have also two components; the 
opportunity cost in which the bank incurs for paying the shareholders the cost of capital, instead of 
paying for an increase of deposits, and the expected cost of a capital shortfall. The Appendix 1 
describes the procedure to estimate the solvency costs function on the basis of the empirical joint 
density function for future flows of revenues and variations of assets. 
   13 
In order to solve the problem of profit maximization, it is useful to define a as the ratio of total 




Then, in general, the first order conditions for profit maximization are derived from the partial 
derivatives of the expected profit function with respect to A,  a, and d, and corresponds to 
equations (A26i-A26iii) in Appendix 1. However, in practice, regulations on the banking sector 
may constraint the set of variables that the bank can set at their optimal value in order to maximize 
profits. Thus, for example, regulations on the minimum equity requirements in relation to risk 
weighted assets; or the minimum liquidity levels in relation to the level and composition of deposits; 
or the minimum capital needed to operate a bank, may imply that in practice the bank, after 
selecting, for example, the level of assets, must adjust a and d to the requirements established by 
the authorities; or that after selecting the optimum levels of A and a, it must adjust d to that 
regulation; or that after A and d are selected, it adjusts a.  Each of these situations defines a 
different set of variables that the bank can effectively set at their optimal level. 
 
On the basis of the results obtained in a previous work by Mora (2004) with a similar model, 
except for the incorporation of bad loans and the longitude of the sample period, in this paper two 
models will be considered for econometric estimation, since they are better suited to make 
comparisons of the degree of competition between different countries. 
  
The first model assumes that the bank selects a and d, in which case a combination of the first 
order conditions (A26.ii) and (A26.iii) gives the following equation for the spread between the real 
interest rate charged on loans and the real interest rate paid on deposits by the bank j and time t: 
 





















+ Y + + + +














t t t t j t j
D
j
t t D E t j
E D t j t j t j t j t j
D
j
t j t j
t j t j
E
j
t j t j
i d
q
a C C i a















, , , , ,





[ ] ( )
A A S
A L b A C A A i A b A b r
) 1 ( ) , , (
) , , ( ) , , , ( * * ) * ( * ) 1 ( * * ) 1 ( E (2)
d r a d
a d a d d d a a p
- + -
- - - - - - =    14 
where the term (lj/hE) corresponds to the coefficient measuring the monopoly power in the market 
for loans and (qj/hD) to the monopoly power in the market for deposits.
13 These coefficients are 
larger, the lower the degree of competition in those markets. Since l j  (qj) measures the response 
of the market’s total loans (deposits), when bank j decides to increase its own loans (deposits), 
and hE (hD) correspond to the elasticity of the demand function for loans (supply of deposits) in 
the market, then perfect competitive markets l j  and qj tend to zero and hE and hD tend to infinity. 
The lower the degree of competition in the market for loans, the larger the spread, according to 
equation (3). In the case of the market for deposits, the corresponding coefficient that measures 
the monopoly power multiplies a composite variable that adopts a negative value if the ratio of 
deposits to total assets is larger than 0.5. Under these circumstances, the lower the degree of 
competition in the market for deposits, the larger the spread.
14 These two are the main coefficients 
of interest in this paper, since they measure the degree of competition in those markets. 
 
In addition, in equation (3), e j,t (dj,t) represent the share of bank j’s loans (deposits) within the 
total of loans (deposits) in the market; aj,t (dj,t) , the ratio of loans (deposits) to total assets for 
bank j; kj,t the ratio of liquid assets to deposits; CD and CE the marginal operating cost of deposits 
and loans; f j,t and ?j,t, the probabilities of a liquidity or solvency shortfall, respectively; and rt the 
cost of capital in the market.  
 
According to equation (3), the real spread is positively related to the probabilities of liquidity or 
solvency shortfalls (f j,t and ?j,t); the ratio of reserve requirements (kj,t); the operational marginal 
costs (C D and CE); the cost of capital (rt); the share of bad loans in the portfolio of loans (bj,t); the 
relative size of the bank within the market (ej,t or dj,t); and the level of the real interest rate (ij,t or 
rj,t). 
 
The second equation for the spread that will be estimated is obtained from the first order condition 
corresponding to equation (A26.iii) in Appendix 1: 
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¶ ” ; ; ; ; ; h h   
14 In fact, in the monthly data used for econometric estimation, that composite variable, (1-2dj,t)d j,t i j,t, adopts 
negative values in 78% of the observations of individual banks in Bolivia; 80% in Colombia; 74% in Costa 
Rica; 75% in Ecuador; 80% in Perú, and 9% in Venezuela.   15 
where all the variables have already been defined. In this case the spread increases with the 
relative size of the bank in the market for deposits, the level of the interest rates, the proportion of 
liquid assets, the marginal operating costs, and the probabilities of liquidity and solvency shortfall. 
In addition, for ratios of deposits to total assets larger than 0.5, the spread is larger, the lower the 
degree of competition. 
 
2.2.2  The behavior of the variables explaining the spread 
 
The information used in this study to estimate the previous two models is taken from the balance 
sheets and monthly income statements of the individual banks published by the respective banking 
superintendences from January 1997 to December 2004 for Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Perú and Venezuela. In the Bolivian case, this information could only be obtained from January 
1998.
15   
 
The spread was defined as the difference between the monthly rate of return on productive assets 
and the rate paid on deposits, both deflated by the gross rate of monthly inflation of the consumer 
price index (CPI).
16 The former corresponds to the ratio of financial income received in one 
month
17 to productive assets at the end of the previous month.
18 The latter is the ratio of the sum 
of interest payments and financial payments other than interest, to the sum of the deposits and 
other liabilities subject to reserve requirements.  
 
Figure 7 shows the weighted average spread for the FLAR member countries.
19 In Perú and 
Costa Rica the spread, in real terms, has been relatively more stable, but in the second country it 
has been negative along the whole sample period. In Bolivia and Colombia increased significantly 
in the last two years, but in the first country the ascending path has extended along all the sample 
period. By the end of the sample, Colombia’s has reached a similar level to Perú’s and Ecuador’s, 
while Bolivia´s is almost twice as large as the one corresponding to these three countries. Since 
mid 2002, Venezuela’s becomes negative and Costa Ricas’ presents a declining tendency with 
even larger negative values. In general, four, out of the six countries have presented high spreads, 
namely, Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú and Colombia. 
                                                  
15 This information was supplemented with data on liquidity reserve requirements which is also recorded by 
the banking regulators (Superintendencias). In general, the information is available for the same period as the 
information taken from the balance sheets, except in the cases of Costa Rica where it only exists since 
September 1997. For Venezuela, where the reserve information is not available, we decided to construct it by 
applying the reserve requirement rates to the liabilities subject to reserve requirements, although their degree 
of aggregation in the balance sheet only allows approximate estimations of the true values for the reserve 
requirements. 
16 The gross inflation rate is defined as 1 plus the inflation rate of the period. 
17 Financial income is the sum of interest income (current and default) and financial income other than interest, 
such as valuation of investments, dividends, commissions, foreign-exchange income, income from derivatives, 
and financial income from lease operations. 
18 The productive assets consists of the sum of  loans (performing and bad loans); investments in fixed and 
variable income securities; and trustee rights. 
19 The weighting variable is the share of each bank’s revenues in the total of revenues in the banking sector.    16 
The probabilities of liquidity and solvency shortfalls were estimated as described in section 2.1 of 
the Appendix 1, for each bank. Figures 8 and 9 show the weighted average of those probabilities, 
using as a weighting variable the share of each bank total reserves (or liquid assets), and equity, 
respectively, within the total banking sector in each country.  
 
The probability of liquidity shortfall has declined since 2002 in almost all countries, with the only 
exception of Perú which has experienced a substantial increase and reached the highest level of 
the six countries during 2004. Along the whole sample, Perú and Colombia have presented the 
highest probabilities of illiquidity; even though Venezuela reached similar levels during 2002 and 
2003, but then declined sharply. Bolivia and Costa Rica exhibit a constant declining path to very 
low levels by the end of 2004. Ecuador’s increased during the period of large macroeconomic 
imbalances but has decreased substantially since then. 
 
As expected, the probability of insolvency (Figure 9) has been much smaller than the probability 
of illiquidity in all countries, but with some peaks in periods of macroeconomic imbalances, 
specially in Ecuador. As in the case of the probability of illiquidity, Colombia has presented the 
highest levels. 
 
It is worthy to emphasize that Colombia presents the highest probability of liquidity and solvency 
shortfalls; while at the same time their indexes of official restrictions to capital flows are also the 
highest, suggesting that those controls do not isolate the banking sector in this country from the 
disturbances they attempt to address. 
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Bolivia Costa Rica EcuadorFigure 10 presents the average weighted ratio of observed required reserves to d’eposits and 
liabilities.
20 Required reserves are those reported by the banking superintendences
21 and their 
behavior over time is the result of both, the regulation on legal required reserve rates imposed for 
different types of liabilities, and the decisions on the composition of these liabilities, adopted by the 
banks. It may be observed that in contrast with the cases of the probabilities of illiquidity and 
solvency shortfalls, Colombia reduced considerably the required reserves ratio since 1998, to 
almost the lowest level in the region. Only Ecuador presents a slightly lower ratio since 2001. This 
measure must have contributed to outweigh the positive effects on the spread originated in the 
larger probabilities of shortfalls in this country. Even though Perú presents a declining path for the 
required ratio until 2000, and Costa Rica until 2002, the first country stabilized at the highest level 
of the group afterwards, only similar to Venezuela’s, while Costa Rica started and ascending path 
since then. Bolivia is the only country in the group that has maintained an increasing path since 
1998, but at the end of the sample its level is still lower than Perú’s and Venezuela’s and similar to 
Costa Rica’s.   
 
It is interesting to note that not necessarily countries with the highest required reserves ratios 
(Figure 10) are the ones with the smallest probability of illiquidity (Figure 8), as illustrated by the 
case of Perú, where exactly the opposite occurs. 
 
Other group of variables affecting the spread  is the marginal operating costs. These were 
estimated as explained in section 2.3 of Appendix 1. Figures 11 and 12 show the weighted 
average of the marginal operating costs of deposits and loans, respectively.
22 There is a large 
variation across countries. In both cases, Ecuador presents by far the largest marginal costs, while 
Perú and Costa Rica, the lowest. Colombia’s and Bolivias’ marginal costs of loans has been as 
eight times as large, on average, than those for Perú; while in the case of the marginal costs of  
deposits that proportion is 5 times for Colombia and 2 times for Bolivia. However, in Colombia 
the marginal cost has d ecreased constantly, along the sample period, while Bolivia’s has 
increased. Venezuela’s marginal costs of deposits increased sharply in 2004 and had been, in 
general, twice those of Colombia. 
 
The cost of capital is the rate that must be paid to shareholders in order for them to invest their 
savings in an specific firm, which varies across firms of different sectors. However, given the 
constraints of information on the capital market of each country, it is not possible to use at this 
moment estimates of the capital cost of individual banks. It will be necessary to use a proxi, 
common to all banks in the same country, instead of specific estimates for 
                                                  
20 The weighting variable is the share of the deposits in each bank in the total of deposits in the banking 
sector. 
21 Except for Venezuela, as explained in a previous footnote, where the data of required reserves is not available 
in the Superintendencia and, therefore, the ratio was estimated by applying the reserve requirement rates to the 
liabilities subject to reserve requirements. Unfortunately, the degree of aggregation in the balance sheet only 
allows approximate estimations of the true values for the reserve requirements.  
22 In both cases the weighting variable corresponds to the share of each bank’s operating costs within the 
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Bolivia Costa Rica Ecuadorindividual banks. This  proxi corresponds to the maximum of two variables. The first one 
corresponds to rate of USA treasury bills with maturity three months of maturity increased by the 
spread of sovereign country bonds and expressed in domestic currency. The second variable is 
the deposits interest rate in each market. Both variables are measured in real terms. Figure 13 
shows the proxi for the cost of capital. It has been substantially higher for Ecuador, relatively 
stable and small for Perú and Costa Rica, since 1997; and highly volatile for Ecuador and 
Venezuela. In Bolivia and Colombia the range of variation has been wider than in Perú and Costa 
Rica, but narrower than in Ecuador and Venezuela, with an average level larger than in the other 
four countries. In the last years of the sample period it has decreased slightly in all countries. 
 
Figure 14 shows the percentage of bad loans in the total portfolio of loans.
23 It increased 
substantially for Colombia and Perú for the period 1998-2001, but has decreased substantially 
since then, to levels similar to the other countries by 2004, of around 2%-4%. In Ecuador it 
reached the highest level (22%) among the six countries in the period of macroeconomic 
imbalances, but has also reduced since then.  Bolivia and Costa Rica has shown a more stable 
proportion of bad loans, of about 3%-5%, on average, while those of Colombia and Perú rose up 
to 12% in 2000. 
 
Finally, in order to measure the degree of concentration of the banking sector in each country, 
Figure 15 shows the proportion of total loans that is held by the 20% of banks with the largest 
shares in each country. The relative size of the banks varies broadly between countries. In general, 
it is much larger in Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador and, recently, Costa Rica, than in Colombia and 
Bolivia. However, it decreased until 2000 in Venezuela and Perú and then started rising again; 
while in Costa Rica has been increasing continuously since 1998 in a very significant way and in 
Colombia has increased slightly since 2000. Only in Bolivia the degree of concentration fell in the 
recent years.   
 
In synthesis, the previous descriptions suggest that behind the relatively large spread in Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Perú lie different reasons. Colombia and Perú have presented large 
probabilities of liquidity shortfalls, a high cost of capital and a large share of non performing loans. 
Colombia has also had relatively large marginal operating costs, the same as Bolivia and Ecuador. 
However, Colombia and Ecuador has presented the lowest ratio of reserve requirements, while 
Perú the highest. In Bolivia, the relatively largest cost of capital might had also contributed to high 
spreads.  
 
A formal test of the incidence of those variables in the spread is provided in the next section. 
 
 
                                                  
23 For each country the weighting variable is the share of each bank’s loans in the total value of loans for the 
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Bolivia Costa Rica Ecuador2.2.3  Econometric estimation of the models for the spread: the monopoly power 
in different countries 
 
The model of equation (3) was estimated for each country as a system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) in order to capture the effect of the cross section covariances of the 
disturbances between individual banks, given that they are subject to common shocks.  
 
To estimate the parameters lj/hE and qj/hD it was assumed that each of them was equal among the 
banks within the same country.
24  All other coefficients in the model were allowed to differ 
between banks.
25 Table 1 presents the results. Since for most variables we estimated one 
coefficient for each bank, in those cases the table reports the range of values of the estimated 
coefficients, as well as the range of the t-student statistics.  
 
In general, for the majority of countries only the coefficients measuring the monopoly power in the 
loans and deposit markets are statistically significant for the whole sample from 1997.2 to 
2004.12. H owever, in the case of the deposits market, the corresponding coefficient is not 
significant for Bolivia
26, while in the case of Colombia it is significant and with the expected sign for 
63% of banks; for Costa Rica 89%; Ecuador and Perú 90%; and Venezuela 100%. As will be 
shown latter on, the specification in the model of equation (3) seems better suited to measure 
competition in the loans market, since in this case the coefficient has the desired properties of 
significance and expected sign for 100% of the banks. Out of the other explanatory variables in 
Table 1, only in Colombia are the marginal operating costs significant for the majority of banks, 
while other variables in any country are either significant or have the expected sign but for a small 
proportion of banks.  
 
For the previous reasons, the results of Table 1 will be used to compare the degree of competition 
only in the loans market. The ranking, according to the size of the coefficient of the second 
variable, from the most competitive country to the least, and for the whole sample period, is the 




                                                  
24 In order to be able to identify the parameters of main interest, namely l/hE and q/hD, the observed values aj,t 
and dj,t were taken as part of the explanatory variable, instead of estimating l/ahE and q/(1-2d)hD. The problem 
of identification arises from the fact that given N banks, we would have had, N estimated coefficients of l/ahE 
and N+1 unknowns. Apart from the problem of identification, the logic for including a in l/ahE is that the 
estimated coefficient would correspond to the optimal level a, instead of the observed ratio. 
25 In the case of the coefficient of the opportunity cost of capital (r), for which the functional specification 
imposed a specific value of 2, the coefficient was permitted to be different from 2, since this specification 
achieves a better adjustment of the regressions by country, and because a proxy for the cost of capital, instead 
of the true variable is being used. 




Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Perú Venezuela
Explanatory variable
-1.03 20.29 38.04 24.32 6.59 10.23
t-Student statistics -1.03 26.56 182.28 13.36 20.86 18.33
expected sign no sí sí sí sí sí
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.0 62.5 88.9 90.0 90.0 100.0
4.95 5.02 12.58 14.82 3.14 4.70
t-Student statistics 58.55 38.65 28.22 63.30 50.60 31.58
expected sign sí sí sí sí sí sí
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
-16.74 -146.17 -16.00 -187.05 -309.42
t-Student statistics -4.20 -4.61 -13.82 -148.80 -9.01
expected sign no no no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.04 a 0.49 0.06 a 0.96 -6.52 a 2.29 0 a 0.003 -0.94 a 1.43 -0.06 a 0.26
t-Student statistics -0.85 a 10.73 2.81 a 25.19 -12.32 a 5.36 3.15 a 3.15 -5.82 a 335.17 -4.85 a 8.49
expected sign sí sí no no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 58.3 87.5 11.1 10.0 40.0 25.0
-0.003 a 0.04 -0.0002 a 1.69 -0.01 a 0.02 -0.03 a 0.15 -0.0005 a 0.01 -0.01 a 0.01
t-Student statistics -1.6 a 3.09 -0.07 a 3.28 -1.39 a 2.85 -5.92 a 3.12 -0.39 a 6.17 -0.68 a 3.45
expected sign no no no no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 25.0 6.3 22.2 10.0 40.0 6.3
0.04 a 0.04 -1 a 0.07 0.02 a 2.7 0.01 a 0.01 0.04 a 0.09 0.02 a 0.6
t-Student statistics 0.92 a 0.92 -44.67 a 2.81 0.36 a 4.43 0.48 a 10.96 2.1 a 3.41 2.72 a 2.98
expected sign no no no no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.0 6.3 11.1 10.0 20.0 12.5
RHO (r) -0.001 a 0.15 0 a 0.84 -0.11 a 0.28
t-Student statistics -0.03 a 2.11 0 a 3.72 -3.68 a 4.87
expected sign no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.0 0.0 10.0
Source: Author's estimations
Econometric estimation of Model-equation (3)
(The bank selects alpha y delta)
Table 1
( ) j j ji d d 2 1-
y j ji d
( ) D E C C +
( )f k + 1




Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Perú Venezuela
Variable explicativa
33.44 21.64 16.97 38.83 13.17 14.98
t-Student statistics 41.48 92.53 15.97 14.99 26.66 24.13
expected sign sí sí sí sí sí sí
% banks with statistical significance and expected sign 81.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
0.73 a 1.05 -0.46 a 1.01 -0.79 a 1.01 0.25 a 0.75 0.22 a 1.38 -0.5 a 0.97
t-Student statistics 53.63 a 190.85 -16.87 a 146.23 -30.63 a 14.5 6.14 a 51.51 5.43 a 46.81 -8.92 a 29.62
expected sign si si si si si sí
% banks with statistical significance and expected sign 81.8 85.7 66.7 100.0 100.0 87.5
-0.001 a 0.22 -0.35 a -0.02 -0.03 a -0.03 -12.44 a 0.12 -0.01 a 0.03 -0.07 a 0.14
t-Student statistics -0.09 a 5.76 -3.9 a -0.55 -0.65 a -0.65 -8.21 a 2.07 -2.28 a 7.47 -2.8 a 3.26
expected sign no no no no no no
% banks with statistical significance and expected sign 9.1 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 18.8
0.08 a 1.63 0.64 a 1.51 -0.89 a 0.25 -1.02 a 1.17 -0.01 a 0.19
t-Student statistics 2.39 a 14.75 0.47 a 2.26 -6.41 a 12.36 -2.91 a 11.84 -1.04 a 5.87
expected sign sí no no no no
% banks with statistical significance and expected sign 57.1 16.7 20.0 20.0 31.3
-0.99 a 0.03 -0.08 a 0.04 -0.02 a 0.31 -0.89 a 0.04 0.07 a 0.07 -0.29 a -0.02
t-Student statistics -2.37 a 2.45 -1.03 a 4.75 -5.4 a 0.3 -2.09 a 12.82 6.67 a 6.67 -4.97 a -2.63
signo esperado no no no no no no
% bancos donde es significativa y signo esperado 9.1 7.1 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0
1477.98 -48.63 62.79 -58.52 -585.67 -946.98
t-Student statistics 1.93 -6.72 11.83 -29.23 -13.68 -7.89
expected sign sí no no no no no
% banks with statistical significance and expected sign 18.2 28.6 33.3 40.0 40.0 25.0
RHO (r) 0.01 a 0.24 -0.35 a 0.32 0.22 a 1.29 0.07 a 0.22 -0.2 a 0.11 0.04 a 0.26
t-Student statistics 0.62 a 3.51 -1.85 a 2.52 1.07 a 2.26 1.78 a 2.83 -1.99 a 2.86 0.9 a 2.81
expected sign no no no no no no
% banks with statistical significance and expected sign 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Source: Author's estimations
Table 2
Econometric estimation of Model-equation (4)
(The bank selects delta)
( ) j j j i d d 2 1 -
( ) i r +
y j j i d
( ) y D C i + + 1
D C
( ) y D C i + + 1
f kTable 2 reports the results of estimating the model in equation (4). In this case, and in contrast 
with the previous results in Table 1, the coefficient measuring the monopoly power in the market 
for deposits is significant and with the expected sign for 100% of the banks in almost all countries, 
with the only exception of Bolivia where the percentage of banks for which those two desired 
characteristics are met is 82%. Out of the other explanatory variables, only the level of the interest 
rate, (i+r), has those characteristics for the majority of banks. According to  the size of the 
coefficient of the first variable, the ranking of competition from the most competitive country to the 
least, and for the whole sample period, is the following: Perú, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador. As in the case of the loans market, Perú and Venezuela are the most 
competitive, and Ecuador the least. Other countries are in between. 
  
However, the degree of competition may vary along time. For this reason, the coefficients l/hE and 
q/hD were estimated along the sample period by means of rolling estimations
27 of the system for 
each country, using equations (3) and (4), respectively, for the reasons explained above. Figure 
16 shows the resulting estimate of the monopoly power in the market for loans, and Figure 17, the 
one corresponding to the monopoly power in the market for deposits.
28 
 
It can be observed in Figure 16 that the largest monopoly power in the loans market corresponds, 
by far, to Ecuador. With the only exceptions of Perú and Bolivia, the degree of competition has 
declined in the last two years. In the case of Costa Rica it increased substantially in 2002, above 
Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela and Perú, changing completely the previous ranking of countries 
according to the monopoly power in that market. Before 2002 this ranking, from less to more 
competitive, was: Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela and Perú, while by the end of 2004 it is: 
Ecuador, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela and Perú. Out of the largest markets, 
Colombia has been the less competitive, and has maintained a relatively constant degree of 
monopoly power in that market, as well as Venezuela and Perú. In the group of smaller markets, 
only Ecuador has been relatively constant, while the monopoly power in Bolivia and Costa Rica 
has varied significantly. 
 
The degree of competition in the market for deposits (Figure 17) has evolved in a different way. In 
this case three countries present an increasing tendency of monopoly power along time, namely, 
Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela; while Colombia, Perú and Costa Rica are slightly more 
competitive in recent years than in the past. However, there are two groups clearly defined in 
terms of the degree of competition: the least competitive group is 
  
 
                                                  
27 This method consists of expanding the sample of estimation, month after month, from an initial sample long 
enough as to allow for the initial estimation. 
28 The t-student statistics indicate that the coefficients shown in Figures 16 and 17 are significant even at the 
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Bolivia Costa Rica Ecuador 
 
composed, in descending order of monopoly power, by Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia. The 
other group, also in descending order of monopoly power, is conformed by Venezuela, Costa 
Rica and Perú. 
 
On the other hand, it is important to mention that even though in Tables 1 and 2 the coefficients for 
the other variables, different from the ones measuring the monopoly power, are not statistically 
significant for the majority of banks, they are up to certain degree significant across countries. In 
fact, Table 3 shows that the explanatory variables, in which the probability of liquidity shortfalls, 
the marginal operating costs, and the cost of capital enter as a multiplicative factor, are strongly 
significant.  
 
The difference between Tables 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Table 3, on the other, is that in the 
first two tables the models are estimated for each country, with the mentioned variables varying 
only along time; while in Table 3 the estimation captures also the variance across countries of 
those variables. In estimating the model reported in Table 3, the monopoly power in the loans 
market was constrained for each country to the values of Table 1, and the monopoly power in the 
deposits market, to the values of Table 2. 
 
Therefore, the results shown in Table 3 confirm the hypothesis mentioned in section 2.2.2, that 
differences in the level and the variance of the spreads between countries are explained, in a very 
important way, by differences across countries in the probability of liquidity shortfalls, the marginal 
(Country specific restrictions on the coefficients of  monopoly power in the loans and deposits market)
Explanatory variable with equality restrictions on coefficients 
among banks of the same country Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Perú Venezuela
33.44 21.64 16.97 38.83 13.17 14.98
t-Student statistics n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
expected sign yes yes yes yes yes yes
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
4.95 5.02 12.58 14.82 3.14 4.70
t-Student statistics n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
expected sign yes yes yes yes yes yes
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
-97.35 -263.57 -12.18 435.91 -163.35
t-Student statistics -24.99 -13.40 -5.47 61.14 -9.32
expected sign no no no yes no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Explanatory variable with equality restrictions on coefficients 
among countries Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Perú Venezuela
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
t-Student statistics -9.82 -9.82 -9.82 -9.82 -9.82 -9.82
expected sign no no no no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039
t-Student statistics 18.82 18.82 18.82 18.82 18.82 18.82
expected sign yes yes yes yes yes yes
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.0220 0.0220 0.0220 0.0220 0.0220 0.0220
t-Student statistics 17.29 17.29 17.29 17.29 17.29 17.29
expected sign yes yes yes yes yes yes
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
RHO (r) 0.3070 0.3070 0.3070 0.3070 0.3070 0.3070
t-Student statistics 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03
expected sign no no no no no no
% banks with statistically significance and expected sign 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(*) Coefficients obtained from country specific model regressions of equation (3)
Cross section results imposing restrictions on coefficients among banks within the same country and restrictions on coefficients among countries
Table 3
Econometric estimation of model in equation (3)
(The bank selects alpha y delta)
( )
D E C C +
( ) j j ji d d 2 1 -









( )f k + 1
( ) y E D C C i + + + 1
*
*  27 
operating costs, and the cost of capital, besides the monopoly power in the loans and deposits 
markets. The only variable that does not have the expected sign in Table 3 is the one associated 
with the probability of solvency shortfalls. 
 
2.2.4  Monopoly capital controls power in the banking sector and  
 
From the results of the previous sections of this chapter it may be formally tested what is the 
relation between the degree of monopoly power in the markets for loans and deposits, and the 
degree of integration of the financial system with the rest of the world.  
 
With this purpose the statistical relation between the previous coefficients of monopoly power and 
the indicators of capital liberalization will be tested. As explained, de jure indicators of capital 
controls have annual periodicity, while de facto indicators as well as the estimates of monopoly 
power obtained by rolling regressions have monthly periodicity. In order to make the best possible 
use of all available information, the test will be made with the two sets of data, monthly and annual. 
The annual data may allow to control for the incidence of other variables on the monopoly power, 
which are not available in monthly frequency. Even though the main interest will be to estimate the 
correlation between monopoly power and capital controls, standard regressions will be used to 
test this relationship in order to be able to verify the stationarity of the residuals obtained from 
these regressions and, then, to test for the true statistical significance of the coefficients. In other 
words, in this way it will be possible to tests weather the correlation between those two variables 
is robust or merely spurious.     
 
Table 4 uses monthly data and presents the coefficients as well as the t-student statistic of a 
regression between the coefficients of monopoly power obtained by rolling regressions from the 
estimation of equations (3) and (4), described in the previous section, and the measure of capital 
controls, which in this case corresponds to the real interest rate differential. It may be observed 
that the coefficients of monopoly power in the loans and deposits markets estimated in equation 
(3) are statistically significant. It is worthy to mention that the dependent and explanatory variables 
are integrated of degree one. However, the residuals obtained in the regressions reported in Table 
4 are, in both cases, stationary. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the correlation between 
monopoly power and de facto indicator of capital controls is significant and robust, and of the 
type of a long term relation. On the other hand, the coefficient of the regression in which the 
monopoly power in the deposits market is estimated from equation (4) is not significant. 
   28 
To provide a basis of comparison for the regressions using  de facto (monthly) and de jure 
(annual) indicators of capital controls, the simple average of the monthly series for the twelve 
months in each year was estimated for the variables of monopoly power and real interest rate 
differential. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 5.
29 It may be observed that the 
interest rate differential, either in nominal or real terms, is significantly correlated with the measures 
of monopoly power obtained from the estimation of equation (3). However, these indices are not 
correlated with the measure of monopoly power obtained from equation (4). In the case of this 
model, it is the general de jure indicator of capital controls the one that is correlated significantly 
with the index of monopoly power in the deposits market; while none of de jure indices are 








                                                  
29 Unfortunately, in the case of the residuals of the regressions in Table 5, it was not possible to check for 
stationarity, since the time series are very short, from 1997 to 2004.  
Explanatory Variable: Capital Controls Coefficient t-stat
Real Interest Rate Differential 0.0069 5.7178
Explanatory Variable: Capital Controls Coefficient t-stat
Real Interest Rate Differential 0.0604 8.7397
Explanatory Variable: Capital Controls Coefficient t-stat
Real Interest Rate Differential 0.0080 1.4057
Source: Author's estimations
Dependent Variable: Monopoly power in the loans market - Model Eq. (3)
Dependent Variable: Monopoly power in the deposits market - Model Eq. (3)
Dependent Variable: Monopoly power in the deposits market - Model Eq. (4)
Table 4
Monopoly Power and Capital Controls
(Monthly Data in Levels)
*  29 
 
Explanatory Variable: Capital Controls Coefficient t-stat
De facto measures
Real Interest Rate Differentials 0.0162 2.5825
Nominal Interest Rate Differentials 0.0098 2.6037
De jure measures (AREAR)
Index of total capital controls 0.0935 0.0448
Index of control on capital markets securities, 
collective investment and institutional investors
0.5857 0.3111
Explanatory Variable: Capital Controls Coefficient t-stat
De facto measures
Real Interest Rate Differentials 0.1171 2.4598
Nominal Interest Rate Differentials 0.0666 2.3927
De jure measures (AREAR)
Index of total capital controls 0.0487 0.0213
Index of control on capital markets securities, 
collective investment and institutional investors
9.1299 0.8331
Explanatory Variable: Capital Controls Coefficient t-stat
De facto measures
Real Interest Rate Differentials 0.0376 1.2790
Nominal Interest Rate Differentials 0.0275 1.6577
De jure measures (AREAR)
Index of total capital controls 8.9299 2.1422
Index of control on capital markets securities, 
collective investment and institutional investors
6.9805 1.8189
Source: Author's estimations
Dependent Variable: Monopoly power in the deposits market - Model Eq. (3)
Dependent Variable: Monopoly power in the loans market - Model Eq. (3)
Dependent Variable: Monopoly power in the deposits market - Model Eq. (4)
Table 5
Monopoly Power and Capital Controls
(Anual Data in Levels)
*
**  30 
In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show that there exists a clear correlation between the 
indicators of effective controls on capital flows and the degree of monopoly power in the markets 
for loans and deposits, when these two indices are estimated from the specification in equation 
(3). The indicators of official restrictions do not present the same significant correlation with 
monopoly power, except when this measure is obtained by the estimation of equation (4), for the 
deposits market. This may suggest that official controls are not as good indicators of effective 
protectionism to the banking sector as the indices of effective, or de facto, financial liberalization 
are. 
 
3.  Capital account controls, growth and macroeconomic volatility 
 
Fist of all, this section estimates a standard growth regression, based on theoretical grounds and 
empirical findings, to evaluate the effects of the capital account controls on economic growth for 
the FLAR’s member countries.
30  
 
Four alternative measures, two in addition to those two used in section 2, of capital account 
controls are used as the interest explanatory variables in the estimable growth equation. That is, 
we use the extension of the de jure measure built by Miniani (2004) and the de facto indicator of 
the real interest rate differential proposed by Frankel (1992). The other two de facto measures, 
which are indicators of effective financial integration, are the net capital flows (summation of net 
foreign direct investment, net portfolio equity and net debt), and the net foreign assets (stock), the 
latter following the methodology indicated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
31 Secondly, this 
section estimates a specification, in the spirit of Razin and Rose (1994), Easterly et al. (2001), and 
Kose et al. (2003), to quantify the effects of the capital account controls on the volatility of output, 
consumption, and investment in the FLAR’s member countries.  
 
The data cover the period from 1983 to 2003 [t =1, …, T = 21] and the countries (individuals) 
are Bolivia (BOL), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRA), Ecuador (ECU), Perú (PER) and 







                                                  
30 Some of the recent theoretical and empirical references on growth models are Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), 
Barro (1991), Rebelo (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), King and Levine (1993), Barro and Lee (1996), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995), Sach and Warner (1995), Levine (1997), Rodrick (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Easterly 
and Levine (2003), and Klein (2005).  
31 Their methodology consists on accumulating the different net components of the capital account of a 
country’s balance of payments. We transform the calculations in such a way that an increase in the indicator 
means that country’s net foreign liabilities increase (net foreign assets decrease).       
32 Appendix A.2 describes the data, the sources, and the units of measurement.   31 
Before running the estimations, some recalls are needed given the available data. First, the sample 
size of the time series for each of the countries is not as long as desirable for econometric 
purposes, so that  the individual  estimations for each of the countries might face sample size 
problems. Second, and as a result of the small sample size, rather than using quinquennal or 
decade intervals, as in the standard growth regressions, we use yearly intervals for the estimations. 
This might create a “noise” introduced by business cycle variation in the  GDP, as argued by 
Rodriguez and Rodrick (1999).
33 Third, if the data is pooled, the number of time series available is 
higher than the number of individuals, which challenges the results and the asymptotic analysis of 
the standard panel data approach (assumes N>T), as discussed by Wooldridge (2002, ch. 10) 
and Hsiao (2003, section 10.2). Fourth, the panel data procedure chosen needs to take care of: 
(1) endogeneity problems, (2) nonstationarity nature of the time series, and (3) possible presence 
of serial correlation along the time series.   
 




In order to deal with the first issue discussed above, individual regressions using cointegration 
techniques á la Johansen, given the endogenous and nonstationary behavior of some of the time 
series, were carried out.
35 Here there is a trade-off between the possible statistical weaknesses of 
the results and the benefits of having some information about the possible effects for each of the 
countries in the sample. The growth model regression for each of the countries (that is, for each i), 
normalized by the variable measuring economic growth, is represented by: 
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33 Also, standard “state” variables were not included.  
34 We use STATA V.8.2 for all the calculations, except for the pool unit root tests, where we use EViews V.5. 
The outputs not reported in the paper are available upon request from authors.  
35 Appendix A.3 shows the results of the pool unit rot tests. The individual unit root tests are available upon 
request.   32 
where Gy is the change in the (natural) logarithm of real GDP per capita; Cai is the i-th indicator, 
our variable of interest, of the capital account controls, where i=1, .., 4, as explained above; 
Gpop is the change of the logarithm of the country’s population; Inv is the investment as a 
percentage of GDP; Literate is the logarithm of the literacy rate (percentage of people ages 15 
and above),  Fdl is the  l-th domestic financial depthness indicator,  i=1, .., 3. Thus, three 
alternative indicators are used: the bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio, the liquid liabilities 
(M3) as a percentage of GDP, and the domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP; Open is an indicator of trade openness, defined as the ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP; Icrg is an indicator of the country’s institutional quality; Pdebt is the public debt 
as a percentage of GDP, which is used as an indicator of the country’s risk; and Q is the log of the 
real exchange rate, as a proxy of the terms of trade. The function f(.) is assumed linear in the 
parameters, and t is the time index. The expected signs are in parentheses.
36                 
 
Table 6-1 and 6-2 show the results for each of the FLAR’s member countries under one 
cointegrating relationship and using alternatively two of the  indicators of the  capital account 
controls. Table 6-1 indicates that in the cases of Ecuador and Perú de capital account indicator, 
our variable of interest,  is statistical significant; however, in the former case capital controls 
decrease economic growth while in the latter one increase economic growth. With respect to the 
standard explanatory variables in this type of regression models, in many cases they show the 
expected signs but only a few resulted statistically significant. For example, it is clear that financial 
depthness promotes economic growth in the cases of Ecuador and Venezuela; and that investment 
does the same in the cases of Costa Rica and Ecuador. When the net foreign assets (stock) 
indicator is used, Table 6-2 shows that in two (Bolivia and Ecuador) out of three statistically 
significant cases, capital account openness improves economic growth. Also, notice that in cases 













                                                  
36  Ca has two expected signs: ( -), when indicator  Ca1 ( de jure measure)  or  Ca2  (that  de facto measure 
corresponding to the real interest rate differentials) are used, that is, increases in the capital account controls 
or higher levels (or variability) of the differentials, should have negative effects on growth. (+), when either 
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1/ Numbers in parenthesis are the p-values. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% 
and 5% level, respectively. The constant term is not reported. 
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1/ Numbers in parenthesis are the p-values. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% 
and 5% level, respectively. The constant term is not reported. 
 
 
   35 
In order to face the third and fourth issues discussed above, a dynamic panel data approach is 
used, specifically, the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) procedure. This derives a generalized method 
of moments estimator for the parameters using lagged levels of the dependent variable and 
predetermined variables and differences of the  strictly exogenous variables as explanatory 
variables (covariates).
37   
 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), our economic growth regression is written as: 
 
(6)      it i it it
P
j




, w x , 
 
where i=1,…,6 and t=1, …, 21, aj are the p parameters to be estimated, xit is a 1x4 vector of 
the  strictly exogenous variables  Ca1,  Icrg,  Literate,  and  Fd (the  second variable is  first 
differenced in the  estimation process and the others  enter in levels);  b1 is a 4x1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated; wit is a 1x5 vector of the predetermined variables Gpop, Inv, Open, 
Pdebt, and Q, which are differenced and lagged in the estimation process;
38 b1 is a 5x1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated; ui are the random effects, or country-specific error components, 
which are assumed i.i.d. with variance s
2
u; and eit are the combined time series and cross-section 
(idiosyncratic) error component, which area assumed i.i.d. with variance s
2
e. It is also assumed 
that ui and eit are independent for each country over all period t. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the panel data regressions, which clearly indicates the improvement in 
the estimations results when time series and cross-section data are pooled. It is interesting to see 
that  capital controls, measured through indicator  Ca1,  decreases growth. On the contrary, 
effective capital integration, measured by Ca4, increases economic growth. Most of the other 
covariates that resulted significant present the expected signs. It is worth nothing that robustness of 
the results for variables investment, institutional quality, which promotes growth, and public debt, 







                                                  
37 Some excellent books in panel data analysis are Hsiao (1986, 2003), Baltagi (1995, 2001), and Wooldridge 
(2002). STATA (2003) is illustrative on the subject and it contains many examples on the different topics on 
panel data. 
38 Notice the following: (1) The lagged values of the predetermined variables are used as instruments in the 
estimation process. (2) When either Ca2, Ca3, or Ca4 is used, it will be treated as a predetermined variable. (3) 
Variable gpop is included as a predetermined variable to capture, on contrary to Solow type of hypotheses, 
possible feedback from economic growth towards population growth.   36 
Table 7 
Growth dynamic panel data regressions using alternative capital account 




1  2  3  4  5  6 












D1.Ca1  -0.04* 
(0.08) 
----  ----  ----  -0.03 
(0.12) 
---- 
D1.Ca2  ----  0.00 
(0.14) 
----  ----  ----  ---- 
D1.Ca3  ----  ----  0.00 
(0.20) 
----  ----  ---- 
D1.Ca4  ----  ----  ----  0.00 
(0.15) 
----  0.00** 
(0.04) 
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Number of observ.  108  108  108  108  108  108 
Sargan test of over-









































1/ It uses the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) procedure. “L1” and “D1” mean that the variable is lagged or 
differenced once, respectively. The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Both the constant term and lags or differences of 




3.2  Capital account c ontrols and macroeconomic volatility: Econometrics and 
estimations  
 
To evaluate the effects of the c apital account controls on macroeconomic volatility of output, 
consumption, and investment, instrumental variables techniques for single equations (time series IV 
regressions) and for panel data models are used.  
 
Tables in Appendix A.4 show the results for each of the FLAR’s member countries. Again, the 
findings indicate that capital account controls does not reduce macroeconomic volatility in any of 
the countries, except Costa Rica, where the coefficient of the capital controls indicator resulted 
statistically significant and negative for output volatility. It is worth nothing that for the case of 
Bolivia capital account controls increase output volatility. Trade openness reduces output volatility 
but increases total consumption volatility in the case of Bolivia. On the contrary, in the case of 
Ecuador, trade openness reduces total consumption volatility. Also, for this country volatility of the 
real exchange rate consistently increases macroeconomic volatility. Un unexpected result is that in 
the case of Bolivia inflation reduces output and investment volatility.            
 
To evaluate jointly the effects on volatility, the regression model to be estimated has the form:  
 


















                                                  
39 The overall constant term is reported in Table 8. 
   38 
where i=1,…,6 and t=1, …, 21; y represents the dependent variable, which will be alternatively, 
the volatility of the real GDP (output), consumption, investment, and the ratio of the volatility of 
total consumption (private and public) to output;
40Zit=[Yit  Xit], a matrix of explanatory variables, 
where Yit is a 1x2 vector of observations on the endogenous variables (covariates), which are 
either Ca2 (+), Ca3 (-) or Ca4 (-) indicator of the capital account controls, with their respective 
expected sign in parenthesis, and the variable Open (+/-);
41 Xit=[X1it  X2it] is a matrix, where X1it 
is a 1x5 vector of observations on the exogenous explanatory variables Ca1 (when it is being 
used), volatility of the l-th indicator of the domestic financial depthness (+), inflation rate p (+), 
volatility of the real exchange rate Qv (+), and an indicator of fiscal policy volatility (+), which is 
measured by the volatility of the government real expenditures Vge; X2it is a 1xk vector of 
observations on the k instruments, which are levels and the lags of the exogenous variables; d=[g 
b] is a vector of coefficients where g is a 2x1 vector of parameters of the endogenous variables to 
be estimated; and b is a 5x1 vector of parameters of the exogenous variables to be estimated; mi 
are the country-specific fixed effects, which may be correlated with the variables in Xit, and uit are 
the combined time series and cross-section error component, which  it is assumed to have cero 
mean and to be uncorrelated with the variables in Xit.  
 
Thus, a G2SLS fixed-effects model is used for the estimations because it adjusts better to our 
data, in the sense they exhaust the population (there are six countries that belongs to FLAR and 
they are those we took).
42 Besides we have small number of cross-sectional units, which would 
produce a poor estimate of the variance of the specific random effects in case that the random-
effects model were used. From the point of view of asymptotic theory, the justification for fixed 













                                                  
40 As explained in the appendix, the volatility of a variable is calculated as the standard deviation of the growth 
rate of such a variable, using a rolling window of order four. 
41 The more open the economy, the more vulnerable to external shocks. However, the more open the economy, 
the less volatile consumption should be.   
42 Hsiao (2003, chapter 3) fully discusses why one should use fixed-effects models in cases where data exhaust 
the population.   39 
Table 8-1 




Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption volatility to 
output volatility  2/  















































(Overall) Constant  -010  24.05**  0.01  8.67 
  (0.96)  (0.01)  (1.00)  (0.10) 
         
Number of observ.  102  102  102  102 
R
2: Within =  0.48  0.36  0.08  0.07 
c










F test that all mi=0   11.14**  8.61**  4.50**  4.63** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
1/ It used instrumental variables (the G2SLS implementation of Balestra and Varadharajan-Kishnakumar (1987)) 
to estimate the two-stage least squares fixed-effects estimators. “V” preceding the name of the variable means 
volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors, 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 
relative to income volatility” (Ibid., p. 8). Here the real GDP is used as a proxy of the GNP.  
 
 
Table 8-1 and 8-2 show the results of the panel data regressions using the  Ca1 and  Ca4 
indicators, respectively. Clearly, capital controls does not reduce macroeconomic volatility in the 
FLAR’s member countries, as they are meant. Effective financial integration increase output 
volatility, but the estimate is practically cero. Both the volatility of domestic financial depthness and 
inflation consistently increases the macroeconomic volatility. Opening the economy consistently 
reduces private consumption volatility.      40 
Table 8-2 




Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption volatility to 
output volatility  2/  















































(Overall) Constant  -0.40  14.53**  5.24  7.09** 
  (0.78)  (0.01)  (0.46)  (0.03) 
         
Number of observ.  102  102  102  102 
R
2: Within=  0.46  0.36  0.09  0.06 
c










F test that all mi=0   7.46**  8.23**  2.05*  4.31** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
 
1/ It used instrumental variables (the G2SLS implementation of Balestra and Varadharajan-Kishnakumar (1987)) 
to estimate the two-stage least squares fixed-effects estimators. “V” preceding the name of the variable means 
volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors, 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 
relative to income volatility” (Ibid., p. 8). Here the real GDP is used as a proxy of the GNP.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
On average, the FLAR member countries has maintained a tendency of liberalization of the 
official, or de jure,  restrictions on capital flows, even after the international financial crisis that 
started in 1996, in contrast with other developing countries and emerging markets that tighten 
those controls since then. However, there are d ifferences between these members. While   41 
Colombia has maintained a constant level of full restrictions according to our indicators, all other 
countries liberalized the capital account until 1996. After this year, Bolivia and Venezuela has 
increased controls, while Costa Rica, Ecuador and Perú either continued loosening these controls, 
or kept them at a low and constant level. 
 
Using as an indicator of effective financial liberalization the difference between the domestic and 
the foreign real interest rates, the FLAR group also shows a larger degree of financial integration in 
the nineties than in the eighties, sharing this tendency, in general, with other developing and 
emerging economies. However, there are also large discrepancies between the countries within the 
group due, in part, to the presence of huge macroeconomic imbalances in some of them. By the 
end of the nineties, Colombia and Venezuela presents a lower degree of effective financial 
liberalization than the other four countries. 
 
Since the main interest in one part of this study is to evaluate the relation between capital controls 
and the degree of competitiveness of the banking sector, the monopoly power in the loans and 
deposits market were measured by means of the econometric estimation of two models with 
sound microeconomic principles. The results show that for the whole sample period (1997.1 - 
2004.12), the ranking of countries, from the most competitive to the least in the loans market is: 
Perú, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador; while in the deposits market is: 
Perú, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador. However, the degree of monopoly 
power has changed along time and between countries, as shown by the results of the estimation of 
these parameters by means of rolling estimates on the sample period. Along time it has increased 
in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela and decreased, even though very slightly in Colombia, Costa 
Rica and Perú. 
 
There exists a strong statistical correlation between the degree of financial liberalization and the 
degree of competitiveness of the banking sector, indicating that countries with lower degree of 
international financial integration are, in fact, paying larger costs through larger spreads on financial 
intermediation. 
 
Besides the effect derived from the degree of monopoly power of the banking sector, other 
variables that increase the spread are the probability of liquidity shortfalls (associated with larger 
macroeconomic volatility), the size of the marginal operating costs, the cost of capital, the level of 
reserve requirements and the share of non performing loans. Behind the relatively large spread in 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Perú lie different reasons. Colombia and Perú have presented 
large probabilities of liquidity shortfalls, a high cost of capital and a large share of non performing 
loans. Colombia has also had relatively large marginal operating costs, the same as Bolivia and 
Ecuador. However, Colombia and Ecuador has presented the lowest ratio of reserve 
requirements, while Perú the highest. In Bolivia, the relatively largest cost of capital might had also 
contributed to high spreads. 
   42 
From the macroeconomic point of view,  the results  from the economic growth regressions 
indicate, for example,  that in the cases of Ecuador and Perú de capital account indicator is 
statistical significant; however, in the former case capital controls decrease economic growth while 
in the latter one increase economic growth. With respect to the standard explanatory variables in 
this type of  regression models, in many cases they showed the expected signs and resulted 
statistically significant. It is worth nothing that robustness of the results for variables investment, 
institutional quality, which promotes growth, and public debt, which reduces economic growth. 
For example, domestic financial depthness promotes economic growth in the cases of Ecuador 
and Venezuela, and investment does the same in the cases of Costa Rica and Ecuador. The 
effective financial integration improves economic growth in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador.  
 
With respect to macroeconomic volatility, the findings indicate that capital account controls does 
not reduce it in any of the countries, except Costa Rica, where the coefficient of the capital 
controls indicator resulted statistically significant and negative for output volatility. In the case of 
Bolivia capital account controls increase output volatility. As for the other explanatory variables, 
trade openness reduces output volatility but increases that of consumption in the case of Bolivia. 
On the contrary, in the case of Ecuador, trade openness reduces total consumption volatility. 
Effective financial integration increase output volatility, but the estimate is practically cero. Both the 
volatility of domestic financial depthness and inflation consistently increases the macroeconomic 
volatility.  
 
In summary,  concerning macroeconomics,  the document concludes that, in general, capital 
account controls neither decrease (or improve) growth nor decrease macroeconomic volatility. On 
the contrary, and as it is expected, the capital account liberalization promotes economic growth 
for the FLAR’s member countries. 
 
This paper can be extended in several ways. First, to build additional capital account control 
indicators to capture better the intensity of controls, a common criticism in the literature that 
studies the economic effects of capital account controls (liberalizations). Second, to expand the 
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A.1 The complete model of the banking firm 
   
The theoretical framework used in this paper consists of an extension of the synthesis made by 
Baltensperguer (1985) on the treatment of the banking firm and that was developed in Mora 
(2004) in order to allow for functional specifications appropriate for empirical testing. The only 
difference with that previous work is the treatment of nonperforming loans explicitly in the present 
analysis.  
  
According to this conceptual framework, the banking firm has to decide the scale of its operations 
and the composition of its assets and liabilities. The assets are formed by the liquidity reserves and 
the productive assets. The liabilities include the deposits and current liabilities with the public, and 
equity.  
 
When deciding the structure of its assets, the bank must establish the level of liquid assets that it 
requires to minimize the cost of liquidity associated with unexpected reductions in deposits or 
unexpected loan expansions. Similarly, when deciding the structure of its liabilities, the bank has to 
define the level of equity it requires to minimize the cost of solvency related to the negative cash 
flows in its operation.  
 
Given equations (1) and (2) explained in the main part of this paper, this Appendix explains the 
concepts of liquidity and solvency costs and describes how these two functions, as well as the 
operating costs are estimated for the individual banks in each country. Additionally, the 
development of the first order conditions in order to derive the equation for the spread in 
alternative models is included in the last section.  
 
1.  Liquidity Costs  
 
At time t a bank has to decide the level of liquid assets, Rt,, at which it can meet the liquidity 
requirements established by the authorities, as proportion of deposits, while at the same time 
allows it to cover the reductions in deposits, XD,t+1. At the end of period t+1 there will be a 
deficiency in the liquidity position of a bank if: 
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where k is the proportion of deposits and current liabilities that must be held as liquid assets 
according with the regulation established by the authorities. The left hand side of the preceding 
inequality relates to the effective availability of liquid assets held by the bank at the end of period t+1; and the right side to the availability of liquidity required by the authorities at the end of that 
period. The previous expression shows that, at the time of taking the decision on the level of liquid 
assets that the bank must hold, there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the reductions of the 
deposits in the following period and, therefore, about the value of the deposits at the end of t+1, 
as well as about the value of the liquidity requirements, and about the value of the effective 
availability of liquidity.  
  
If a liquidity deficiency occurs, its magnitude will be equal, according to (A1), to: 
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case in which the bank must pay a sanction, at the rate p, on the value of the liquidity shortfall; 
therefore, the expected value of the sanction for the bank is: 
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However, in practice and compared with the previous specification, the source of uncertainty for 
the banks comes from the fall in deposits, and also from the unexpected expansions of loans (or 
productive assets). This is because an important part of banking activity is formed by contingent 
operations, such as the granting of letters of credit, bank acceptances or credit card limits. The 
decision to enforce a guarantee or to use a credit limit is not controlled by the bank but by its 
customers. For this reason, the effective level of liquidity is also a function of these variables, 
which determine expected and unexpected loan expansions.  
 
Incorporating into the analysis the unexpected loan expansions, XC,t+1, as was done in Julio, J. and 
Mora, H. (1990), the inequality (A1) becomes:  
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and the expression for the cost of liquidity shortfalls is now:   [ ] 1 1
ˆ
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However, in period t the variable  1 ˆ
+ t X  i s not deterministic in the previous expression, but a 
random variable, because the liquidity reserve requirements for the end of period t+1, RRt+1, are 
random in t. Therefore, in t only the joint distribution of Xt+1 and RRt+1 can be known, hence 











+ + ￿ ￿
+
- = t t t t
RR R





as long as RRt+1=kDt+1 and k take values between 0 and 1, the maximum value that the reserve 
requirements can take in period t+1 is the value of the deposits in that period, therefore the upper 
bound of RRt+1  is:  
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The bank’s total liquidity cost for holding reserves is: 
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where r is the opportunity cost of holding liquid reserves, instead of granting loans. Replacing (A8) 




1 1 1 1 , 1
1
1
) , ( ) ˆ ) ( ) 10 ( + + + +
¥
-
+ + ￿ ￿
+
+









According to the previous specification, seven variables determine the liquidity cost function, 
namely: level of liquid assets (Rt), falls in deposits (XD,t+1), loan expansions (XC,t+1), required 
reserves (RRt+1), opportunity cost of liquid assets (r), expected value of deposits (EtDt+1), as the 
upper limit of one of the integrals in (A10); and the sanction rate for reserve shortfall (p). The 
liquid assets include cash and bank balances and other assets with maturity of less than 30 days. 
The deposits include current liabilities at all maturities and other liabilities subject to legal reserve; 
their falls are calculated month by month. Total loans and their expansions are also calculated 
month by month. The average lending rate in the banking system was taken as a proxy of the 
opportunity cost. The latter variable does not enter into the determination of the spread in any of 
the four models presented, but it is important in the estimate of the magnitude of the liquidity costs. The rate announced by the authorities for lower liquidity positions than those required was used as 
proxy for the sanction rate for reserve shortfall. The reason why this is only a proxy is the 
incidence of the form of accounting of the l egal reserve position on liquidity cost. There are 
important differences between countries in this form of accounting. For example, in Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Costa Rica the reference period for accounting for the daily legal reserve positions 
is two weeks; in Ecuador weekly; in Peru monthly. The lags between the required amount of legal 
reserve and the deposits used to calculate the reserve position are also different between 
countries, as is the sanction rate on the amounts of reserve shortfall. Chart 2 shows the effective 
sanction rates for shortfall applied in the six countries.  
 
To determine the expected value of the cost of liquidity, the kernel method was used to estimate 
the joint density function of RRt+1 and the sum of the falls in deposits and loan expansions (Xt+1). 
This is a non-parametric method that assumes that N observations of the vector of variables 
whose joint density function is to be estimated constitute a sample of independent and identically 
distributed observations. The kernel estimator of the multivariate density function of dimension d is 
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and which is usually a symmetrical function. In (A11) h represented the band width and is chosen 
from a size such that the mean squared error between the density function to be estimated and the 
true density function is minimal, approaching zero as the size of the sample increases.  
  
 2.   Costs of solvency for the banks 
  
In each period t+1 the bank must cover its obligations, Dt(1+iD,t+1), and its operating costs, 
C(At,a(1-b),d), with its assets  At+1, and with the income generated by them,  Y t+1, where 
At+1=At+XA,t+1. There is a problem of solvency if this condition is not met, that is, if: 
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taking into account the balance constraint, D=A-W, the expected cost of incurring a situation of 
insolvency is:  
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where a indicates that the cost is proportional to the capital shortfall. But at time t, when the bank 
decides the level of capital Wt, the variable  1 ˆ
+ t Y  is random because At+1 is unknown at that time, 
so, given the joint density function of Y t+1 and XA,t+1, the expression (A14) becomes:  
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If ?t+1 is the cost of capital stock, then ?t+1-iD,t+1 is the marginal cost of increasing the capital stock 
instead of increasing deposits. The total cost function of solvency is therefore:  
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However in relation to the cost of solvency, it is important to distinguish between the rate that the 
bank offers to pay for deposits, iD,t+1, and the interest rate that it effectively pays, which it is 
assumed equals the rate the depositors expect to receive, which we denote by  ih,t+1. This 
distinction is necessary because in the absence of perfect competition, demand for a bank’s 
deposits is a function of the interest rate that depositors expect to receive. The interest payments 
that depositors receive is equal to:  
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Taking into account this difference between the interest rate offered by the bank and the rate 
effectively paid, equation (A14) becomes:  
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From the previous equation, the variables that determine a bank’s cost of solvency are the bank’s 
total income  (Yt+1), changes between periods (XA,t+1) of the value of assets (At+1), operating 
costs C(At,a(1-b),d), equity (Wt), effective interest rate paid on deposits (ih,t+1), sanction rate for 
incurring capital shortfalls (a), and the opportunity cost of capital, (rt+1-iD,t+1). The assets and their 
changes month by month, as well as total income and equity (which includes capital contributions 
and reserves), were taken from the information on the monthly balance sheets and income 
statements published by the national superintendencies for all the banks in operation in each month 
of the period analyzed. To estimate the interest rate effectively paid on deposits, the sum of 
interest payments and financial expenses other than interest
43 was divided by the sum of the 
deposits and the other liabilities subject to legal reserve requirements. 
 
The operating costs correspond, as stated earlier, to the sum of labor costs and the depreciation 
of durable goods. The cost of accessing credit in the international capital market was taken as 
proxy for the sanction rate, represented by the maximum between the  interest rate on 3-month 
US Treasury bonds, plus the value of the sovereign bond spread of the country in question 
expressed in national currency, and the domestic interest rate. The difference between the sanction 
                                                  
43 In some periods and for some banks this sum was negative, in which case it was considered that no (valid) 
information was available at that time. rate and the average domestic deposit rate was taken as proxy for the opportunity cost of capital. 
As this difference was sometimes negative, we increased the proxy of the sanction rate described 
previously, and the proxy of the opportunity cost in the absolute value of the minimum observed 
during the time of the difference, so that the minimum value of the proxy of the opportunity cost 
was 0.  
 
To determine the expected value of the cost of solvency, the kernel method was used to estimate 
the joint density function of Yt+1 and the sum of the falls in deposits and loan expansions XA,t+1, as 
explained above for the case of the expected liquidity cost. 
 
 
3.   Operating costs  
 
The bank incurs in operating costs, C(At,a,b, d)= C(Et,Dt,,B) to perform its functions. These 
costs include labor and depreciation of the durable goods used in the productive process. If w is 
the price of the compound productive factor whose total payment per period corresponds to the 
operating costs, the translogarithmic cost function is given by ln(Ct)=f(ln(Et),ln(Dt), ln(Bt),ln(wt)), 
where ln represents the natural logarithm of the variable in question, corresponds to the Taylor 
expansion of second order around point (ln(E t), ln(Dt),ln(Bt), ln(w t)) = (0,0,0,0):  
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where the partial derivatives are evaluated at the point of expansion, which is why they are 
constant, so the previous expression can be written as: 
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since the cost function must be homogeneous of degree one in prices, and in our case there is a 
single price, ¶(lnC)/¶(ln(w))=1 must be satisfied, therefore: 
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Taking into account these restrictions, equation (23) becomes:  
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Table A1 shows the econometric results of estimating equation (A25) for the six countries, under 
the assumption that the banks of one country share the same productive technology, and 
therefore, that the observations are realizations of the same cost function
44. This assumption was 
represented by the imposition of the restriction of equality between the coefficients for the same 
variable, for all banks in one country, with the exception of the intercept which could differ 
between banks.  
 
In all countries, loans and deposits, or products of these variables, are highly significant but the 
corresponding coefficients are of different magnitude. It is interesting to note that the variable bad 
loans or products of this and other variables were only significant in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. In particular, in the case of Colombia, where marginal operating costs are relatively 
high, in comparison with other countries, nonperforming loans (which has been also relatively high) 
do not constitute a factor explaining this situation, even though bad loans do affect marginal costs 
in Bolivia, the other country with high marginal operating costs of loans, as well as of deposits. 
 
                                                  
44 Because the series required for the estimate, in one of the countries and for a few banks, did not always 
reject the unit root null hypothesis, according to one of the five tests used (Augmented Dickey Fuller, Phillips-
Perron, Zevot-Andrews, Birens, KPSS), equation (25) was estimated as differences of logarithms.    
4.   The spread  
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where the subindexes indicate the variable with respect to which the partial derivative of the 
corresponding function is being taken. In the preceding expression the time subindexes were 
eliminated for simplicity. In turn, the partial derivatives included in (A26) are developed below. 
 
Explanatory Variable Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Perú Venezuela
First Order Difference of the Logarithm of 
Productive Assets
0.093596 0.744971 0.508685 0.408220 0.364502 0.523730
t-statistic 26.41229 7.46599 9.93922 3.83550 28.23995 18.22546
First Order Difference of the Logarithm of 
Deposits
0.650172 0.989409 0.568261 0.622949 0.617230
t-statistic 63.41924 2.08302 8.53119 54.10613 21.55590




First Order Difference of the Squared 
Logarithm of Productive Assets
0.379809 0.063039
t-statistic 47.66612 12.76140
First Order Difference of the Squared 
Logarithm of Deposits
0.298605 0.041245 -0.211269 0.090336
t-statistic 40.19059 3.35721 -5.49749 22.72013
First Order Difference of the Squared 
Logarithm of Non Performing Loans
0.003066 -0.289522 0.145841
t-statistic 3.73827 -4.68593 4.48414
First Order Difference of the product of the  
Logarithm of Productive Assets and the  
Logarithm of Deposits
-0.640048 0.043434 0.273290 -0.027672
t-statistic -41.18760 6.91229 4.04865 -4.475249
First Order Difference of the product of the 




First Order Difference of the product of the 
Logarithm of Deposits and the Logarithm of 
Non Performing Loans
-0.008389 0.500040 0.261437
t-statistic -5.51210 3.98430 5.240337
Source: Author's estimations
Table A1
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Additionally, we define:  
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that is,  f t and ? t, relate to the probabilities, at time  t, of a liquidity or solvency shortfall, 
respectively.  
  
Different combinations of the first order conditions in (A26) provide different models for the 
spread. As explained in the main body of the text, those combinations depend on which are the 
set of  selecting variables available for the bank’s manager, which is directly related to the 
regulation of reserve requirements; solvency requirements; minimum amount of equity required to 
create a bank; and anti monopoly standards; among others. 
 
A.2 Data and sources 
 
Description  Units  Source  Observations 
Nominal GDP   Millions units of 
National Currency 
(MUNC) 
IMF – IFS   
Real GDP  MUNC  IMF – IFS  GDP Deflator 
(2000=100) 
Population  Millions  IMF – IFS   
Real GDP growth 
volatility 
 
Standard Deviation (%) 
(4 period moving 
window) 
Own Calculations  
 





Standard Deviation (%) 
(4 period moving 
window)  
Own Calculations  
 
Government 
Consumption  in 
MUNC deflated by 
CPI 
Real Private Consumption 
Expenditure Growth 
Volatility 
Standard Deviation (%) 
(4 period moving 
window)  




MUNC deflated by 
CPI  
Real Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Growth 
Volatility 
Standard Deviation  
(4 period moving 
window) (%) 
Own Calculations  
 
GFKF in MUNC 









MUNC  IMF - IFS 
 




MUNC  IMF - IFS 
 
 
Real Private Consumption  MUNC  IMF – IFS  CPI (2000 = 100) Nominal Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation 
MUNC  IMF - IFS 
 
 
Real Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 




Current Account Balance  % of GDP  IMF - IFS   NGDP in Millions 
of US Dollars 
de jure capital account 
closeness (openness) 
[ca1] 
Average (0-1)  Juan P. Fernandez 
– Carlos Patiño 
Miniane (2004), 
Indicator 1   
Interest Rates Differential 
Indicator [ca2]   
Rates differential  J.P Fernandez  Frankel (1992), 
Indicator 2 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed Debt 
% of GDP  IFS & WDI  NGDP in Millions 
of US Dollars 
Bank Liquid Reserves to 







Liquid Liabilities (M3) 
[fd2] 
% of GDP  WDI  Financial 
Dephtness 
Domestic Credit Provided 
by Banking Sector [fd3] 
% of GDP 
 
WDI  Financial Depth 
ICRG Composite Risk 
Rating 
0-100  WDI  Institutional Quality 
Literacy Rate (% People 






Net capital flows [ca3]  Mill. of US Dollars  BOP - Own 
Calculations 
Summation of net 
foreign direct 
investment + net 
portfolio equity + 
net debt 
Net Foreign Assets 
(Stock) 
[ca4] 
Mill.of US Dollars  BOP - Own 
Calculations  
Following Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001). 
Exports FOB (X)  Mill. of US Dollars  IMF - IFS   
Imports CIF (M)  Mill. of US Dollars  IMF - IFS   
Trade openness indicator   ((X+M)/GDP)*100  Own Calculations    
Consumer Price Index  Index (2000 = 100)  IMF - IFS   
GDP Deflactor  Index (2000 = 100)  IMF - IFS   
Real Effective Exchange 
Rates 
 
Index (2000 = 100)  IMF - IFS   
School Enrollment, 
tertiary 
% gross (school age 
population) 





A.3 Pool unit root tests  1/ 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002) t* 
Ho : U.R. 
Assumes common U.R. 
process 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(1997) W-stat 
Ho : U.R. 










Statistic   Probability  Statistic   Probability  Statistic   Probabi
lity 
y  -1.8**  0.04  -0.91  0.18  9.5  0.66 
Gy  -5.4**  0.00  -5.72**  0.00  79.7**  0.00 
Lpop  1.67  0.95  7.7  1.00  1.9  0.99 
Gpop  -2.1**  0.02  -1.4*  0.08  21.0**  0.04 
Pdebt  1.4  0.92  -0.8  0.22  12.6  0.40 
Ca3  -2.6**  0.00  -1.0  0.16  25.9**  0.01 
Ca4  0.5  0.67  0.9  0.82  3.9  0.98 
Open  -4.9**  0.00  -4.5**  0.00  15.4  0.22 
Literate  4.6  1.00  7.1  1.00  0.03  1.00 
Inv  1.1  0.87  -1.9**  0.03  29.4**  0.00 
Q  1.2  0.88  0.3  0.63  6.8  0.87 
gQ  -1.1  0.14  -2.6**  0.00  60.3**  0.00 
 
1/ y is the (natural) logarithm of real GDP per capita; Gy is the change in the (natural) logarithm of real GDP per 
capita; Lpop is the logarithm of the country’s population; Gpop is the change of the logarithm of the country’s 
population; Pdebt is the public debt as a percentage of GDP, which is an indicator of the country’s risk; Ca3 is 
the capital account closeness (openness) indicator 3;  Ca4 is the capital account closeness (openness) 
indicator 4; Open is an indicator of trade openness; Literate is the logarithm of the literacy rate (percentage of 
people ages 15 and above); Inv is the investment as a percentage of GDP; Q is the log of the real exchange 
rate; and gQ is the change of the log of the real exchange rate. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical 

















Bolivia  1/ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption 
volatility to 
output volatility  2/  















































         
Number of observations  17  17  17  17 
R
2:   0.90  0.96  0.57  0.48 
         
 
1/ It uses instrumental variables (IV 2SLS) and the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator for the variance. 
“V” preceding the name of the variable means volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the 
p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The 
constant terms are not reported. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 


















Colombia  1/ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption 
volatility to 
output volatility  2/  












































----  ---- 
         
Number of observations  17  17  17  17 
R
2:   0.87  0.74  0.36  0.40 
         
 
1/ It uses instrumental variables (IV 2SLS) the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator for the variance. “V” 
preceding the name of the variable means volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the p-
value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The 
constant terms are not reported. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 















Costa Rica  1/ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption 
volatility to 
output volatility  2/  












































----  ---- 
         
Number of observations  17  17  17  17 
R
2:   0.62  0.49  0.07  0.21 
         
 
1/ It uses instrumental variables (IV 2SLS) and the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator for the variance. 
“V” preceding the name of the variable means volatility, as defined in the text. The symbols “*” and “**” mean 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The symbol “*” means statistical significance at 
the 5% level. The constant terms are not reported. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 















Ecuador  1/ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption 
volatility to 
output volatility  2/  












































----  ---- 
         
Number of observations  17  17  17  17 
R
2:   0.91  0.78  0.68  0.77 
         
 
1/ It uses instrumental variables (IV 2SLS) and the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator for the variance. 
“V” preceding the name of the variable means volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the 
p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The 
constant terms are not reported. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 















Peru  1/ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption 
volatility to 
output volatility  2/  












































----  ---- 
         
Number of observations  17  17  17  17 
R
2:   0.16  0.30  0.68  0.87 
         
 
1/ It uses instrumental variables (IV 2SLS) and the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator for the variance. 
“V” preceding the name of the variable means volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the 
p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The 
constant terms  are not reported. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 

















Venezuela  1/ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of growth 
rate of:  




Ratio of total 
consumption 
volatility to 
output volatility  2/  












































----  ---- 
         
Number of observations  17  17  17  17 
R
2:   0.56  0.59  ----  ---- 
         
 
1/ It uses instrumental variables (IV 2SLS) and the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator for the variance. 
“V” preceding the name of the variable means volatility, as defined in the text. The number in parenthesis is the 
p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The 
constant terms are not reported. 
2/ This ratio is introduced as dependent variable following Kose et. al. (2003). According to these authors 
“this [ratio] can be considered a measure of the efficacy of consumption smoothing, at the national level, 
relative to income volatility” (Ibid., p. 8). Here the real GDP is used as a proxy of the GNP.  
 